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This thesis examines the Flight Hour Program of the
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet (CNAP) in order to
help develop alternate methods for tactical jet squadrons to
prepare for the budgetary constraints imposed due to the
passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. An overview of
the program as it now functions is provided. Comments and
perceptions of the future of the program gathered from
interviews of individuals working with and under the program
are also presented. The thesis examines methods of evaluat-
ing the program and discusses the program's effect on
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The Department of the Navy Programming Manual describes
a budget as:
A planned program for a fiscal period in terms of (a)
estimated costs, obligations, and expenditures, and (b)
source of funds for financing, including reimbursements
anticipated, and other resources implied. [Practical
Comptrollership Manual, 1987]
This thesis looks at how the Tactical Air (TACAIR) community
in the Pacific theatre has worked under the present system
of flight hour funding and the problems the community
projects in attempting to provide both the combat readiness
and cost effectiveness that the nation needs in the future
under this system.
Providing the myriad of resources, including aircraft,
personnel, fuel, and parts required for the nation's desired
level of operational readiness presents a highly complex and
difficult managerial problem. The Navy's Flight Hour
Program (FHP) , is used to manage the Naval Air Force's
budget request for its part of Operations and Maintenance,
Navy (0&M,N) funds. These funds provide the daily operating
dollars for the Navy's overall readiness level. The Flight
Hour Program specifically deals with the line items
Operating Target (OPTAR) Functional Categories.
B. POLICY AND BUDGET FORMULATION ISSUES
Funds are programmed and flight hour policy is
formulated by the Office of the Flight Hour Program Manager
(OP-05E) for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO, OPNAV) . At
the Type Commander level, Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic
Fleet (CNAL) and Commander Naval Air Force Pacific Fleet
(CNAP) , the program is managed by the Air Operations
department (Code 30) and a branch of the Comptroller
department (Code 019). [McDonnell, February 1988]
Individual sguadrons manage the funds provided through these
organizations at a local level. Each organizational level
is responsible for the degree of professionalism with which
it manages the funds received and executes its mission
directives. [McDonnell, February 1988]
Congress bases its decisions for the funding levels of
the various segments of the Navy's budget upon the requests
of the department balanced against the Congress' perceptions
of the needs of the country. [Mills and Palmer, 1983] The
flow of funds is depicted on Figure 1-1 which shows the
Department of the Navy's (DoN) fiscal chain of command
through the Fleet commanders to the Type commanders down to
the Squadron commanders.
C. BUDGET CUTS AND OPERATIONS
At the conclusion of the Viet Nam War, Congress cut the
operating budget for the Navy and its Air Force for the























Figure 1-1 Organization for Funds Flow for 0&M,N
Appropriations for USN Fighter Squadrons
funds for the Navy. However, global operating commitments
were not similarly reduced. [CNAP 019, 1988] In addition,
severe increases in the cost of fuel and associated
petroleum products exacerbated the funding problem and cut
back further the ability of the Navy to perform its mission.
In 1986, a fiscally conservative policy was initiated by
Congress and funding for Commander, Naval Air Forces,
Pacific Fleet (CNAP) Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) squadrons
was reduced from its 1985 level of 150.8 million dollars to
135 million dollars. [McDonnell, February 1988] Budget
planners for the Navy anticipate a continuing decline in
actual dollars for the next few years. [Waggoner, February
1988] The Navy must once again address a funding constraint
problem. Having experienced the cutbacks of the seventies,
the Navy must tune its present readiness and training
programs to be able to accept the future funding
constraints. For Naval Air Forces, the program affected is
the Flight Hour Program.
One of the primary goals of the Navy is readiness and
the ultimate goal of the Flight Hour Program is the same.
However, it is an open question whether this system in its
present form provides a sufficient means for assuring
adequate warfare capability to TACAIR squadrons either
through its funding procedure or its method of determining
flying hour requirements for the fleet.
D. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
This thesis examines the Flight Hour Program, evaluates
its planning, funding, and execution, presents specific
program modifications, and provides a list of areas within
the program that would benefit from further research.
The thesis considers potential problems resulting from
the system which the Navy uses to provide training to
accomplish its aviation missions. Results of interviews
with Fighter Squadron personnel and current and former
Commanding Officers are also presented. The results of the
interviews provide proposed methods for dealing with
anticipated operating cutbacks.
During the framing of this research, the original
objective was to examine: 1) How the loss of flight hours
had affected squadron operations? 2) How further cuts
would affect them in the future? As perceived by the
aviators interviewed, the scale down of funding has not yet
affected their combat effectiveness. Financial policy at
higher levels has, so far, maintained a steady flow of funds
for required flight operations. It is at this higher level
(CNAP) that the shifts in funding policy and the realization
of potential readiness problems has occurred. Therefore,
this level is given great consideration in this study.
Subsidiary research questions addressed in this thesis
are: Does the Flight Hour Program adequately provide the
required resources for combat effectiveness? Are the
requirements of the Flight Hour Program either understated
or misstated because of a reliance on past funding levels?
Are the funding levels adequate because of the advances in




The primary source of information and data for this
thesis was interviews with squadron level through Type
Commander level personnel. Additional data were collected
from periodicals, instructions, data files, and message
traffic made available during those meetings. A list of
references is provided at the end of the thesis.
Individuals within the Naval Aviation community were
interviewed at N.A.S. Miramar, N.A.S North Island, and
N.A.S. Lemoore, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval
Aviation Safety School in Monterey, CA, and the office of
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) in
Washington, D.C.
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE
This thesis is divided into five chapters.
Chapter I is an introduction to the issues faced by the
TACAIR community.
Chapter II discusses in more detail the Flight Hour
Program, the fiscal foundation of the Naval Air Force's
readiness level.
Chapter III discusses problems associated with the
program including discussions on efficiency versus
effectiveness and safety considerations.
Chapter IV examines the recommendations of present and
former squadron commanders and CNAP personnel towards
fitting the Training and Readiness requirements to a smaller
operating budget.
Chapter V presents observations and recommendations for
managing the flight requirements of the Fighter community in
the environment of decreasing funds.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter reviews the process by which the Department
of the Navy and the Naval Air Force Type Commanders (CNAP
and CNAL) compute flight hour requirements and analyzes how
the Flight Hour Program funds the fleet for both flight time
and maintenance costs. CNAP and CNAL provide estimates of
the total number of hours "required" for an aircrew to be
operationally mission ready for each type, model and series
(TMS) of aircraft to the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. These hours are then transformed into dollar
amounts and presented for budget consideration. TMS
maintenance costs are also computed on a "cost per hour"
basis and included in the budget request. Once the budget
is approved and the funds are made available to the Navy,
the actual dollar amounts are compared to the amount
requested. Adjustments are then made to the Flight Hour
Program and reflected in adjustments to the Primary Mission
Readiness (PMR) percentages assigned to each phase of a
squadron's operational cycle. A more detailed explanation
follows.
A. HOW THE PROGRAM DEVELOPED
Prior to the end of the Viet Nam war, flight hours were
computed on the basis of Fundamental Mission Requirements
(those hours required for specific warfare specialty
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proficiency such as bombing, air to air gunnery and
intercept training) and Supporting Mission Reguirements
(those hours flown in indirect support of specific mission
reguirements such as x tanker, surface search and cross-
country navigation flights) . These hours were combined to
form the Full Mission Readiness requirement.
After the end of the Viet Nam war, congressional budget
policy forced cuts in the operating funds of the Navy and
its flight hour program. Unplanned price rises for the cost
of fuel aggravated the situation. Full mission readiness
could not be maintained at the new funding levels. [CNAP,
1988] It was then determined that an acceptable level of
readiness could be maintained if the support flying hours
were dropped and the reguired flight hours could then be
linked to those flown in the fundamental or "primary"
mission area. [CNAP, 1988] Thus was born the Primary
Mission Requirement (PMR) which is used to this day for
funding the flight hour program.
B. THE FLIGHT HOUR PROGRAM
The Navy's Flight Hour Program is concerned with the
planning, programming, budgeting and management of the
annual flight hours for US Naval aircraft. The program is a
statement of all requirements, budgeted hours, associated
costs, fuel usage and readiness milestones for the forces.
These factors are converted into a common denominator:
dollars. The dollars are then divided between the two Type
Commanders and distributed between the various squadron
types under their command. The CNAP flight hour program is
divided into three separate categories of squadron types:
Support, Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) , and TACAIR/ASW.
Each category has unique requirements dictating three unique
approaches to funding and flight hour allocation.
The Support category is unique in that it is composed of
numerous subgroups under different operational chains of
command (OPCON) . Two examples include: Test and Evaluation
squadrons (VX) that are directed through the office of CNO
by the Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) schedule and
Amphibious force air assets which are tasked through
COMPHIBGRUEASTPAC. [CNAP, 1987]
Funding and flight hour allocation for the Fleet
Replacement Squadrons are the result of a series of
computations performed by individuals through out the chain
of command. Fleet Replacement Squadrons exist for each type
of aircraft in the Navy's inventory. In some cases, there
are two squadrons, one on the East coast and one on the West
coast. The Fleet Replacement Squadrons are regulated by
their Pilot Training Rate (PTR) . The PTR is assigned by the
TACAIR FRS Training Coordinator in the office of Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) (OP-593C) in a
tasking letter received by the squadrons each May for the
subsequent fiscal year. [CNAP, 1987]
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The number of pilots required is based on a projection
of the number of pilot seats which will open due to cyclical
rotation, accident losses, career changes, and sometimes the
creation of new squadrons. Pilots going through the course
for the first time are designated Category One. Those
pilots with prior fleet experience may take an abbreviated
course schedule or refresher training, and are designated
Category II or higher and have a factor included for their
previous experience. The number of Category II and higher
pilots are converted into a Category I equivalent and added
to the total of Category I pilots. This total is multiplied
by the average number of hours that it takes to qualify a
Category I in type which yields the total number of hours
projected to train the requisite number of pilots. The
average number of hours includes those hours flown for
associated maintenance support. The total number of hours
to train the pilots required is then funded at the cost per
hour rate to arrive at the budget for the FRS. [CNAP, 1987;
Lewis, March 1988]
The TACAIR/ASW Flight Hour Program relies on the PMR as
its foundation for funding requests. The PMR is defined as
the "ability of an aircrew to perform the primary mission of
the assigned aircraft, to include all weather day and night
carrier operations." [CNAP, 1988] The number of hours
required to achieve the PMR is derived in the following
manner. Fleet commanders and the office of CNO have
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developed a syllabus for each type of tactical and anti-
submarine warfare aircraft (this includes US Marine Corps
air assets) . Each syllabus contains a schedule of events
and flight types (e.g., Carrier qualification practice
landings, Air to Air practice missions, Air to Ground
practice missions, Airborne Refueling practice) required for
an average aircrew to achieve and maintain the desired level
of readiness in the primary mission areas for their aircraft
while in their operational squadron. [Lewis, February 1988]
A training matrix for the Fighter (VF) community (F-14
aircraft) is presented in the Appendix. The accomplishment
of all the required missions by the aircrew will give them a
100% PMR rating. The CNO has issued a PMR flight hour goal
for TACAIR/ASW pilots of 25 hours per month or 300 hours per
fiscal year or 450 hours per 18 month operational cycle in
order to achieve that 100% rating. [OP-20, 1987, 1988]
1. CNAL and CNAP Reaction to Congressional Fiscal
Policy
In 1987, the Department of the Navy had to address
the fiscal restraints imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings
Act. In an effort to deal with Congressional direction, CNO
tasked the type commanders (CNAL and CNAP) to develop
funding guidelines for TACAIR/ASW squadrons. [Lewis, 1987]
These guidelines were developed to accept the funding
shortfalls for that year while maintaining a desired level
of both dollars and flight hours for deployed squadrons.
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The guidelines, depicted in Figure 2-1, represent
the FY87 PMR levels programmed by the TYCOM' s for fighter
squadrons during a generic turn-around cycle after having
received the budget for the year. Given that the cycle is
18 months long, any one squadron would be funded for only
the 12 months of its cycle occurring in that fiscal year.
This is important because the squadrons are susceptible to
major changes in the number of flight hours they will
receive during a cycle. A comparison of the level of PMR
available to a squadrons in FY1987, FY1988 and FY1989 as
shown in Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 reveals that except for
the deployed portions, programmed flying hours allocated are
different for the same phase in different fiscal years. For
instance, a squadron that has just arrived home from cruise
on September 30, 1987 would be looking forward to receiving
funding for 3 0% PMR or 7.5 hours per month (25 hours * 0.3)
per pilot for one month and 78% PMR (19.5 hours/pilot/month)
for the following two months based on its cycle programmed
for FY87. However, as indicated in Figure 2-2 the squadron
was only funded at the 3 0% rate for two of those three
months and was unfunded for the other, a reduction of 31.5
flight hours or a 68% reduction in its training opportunity
for that quarter.
Chanqes to the annual budget can directly affect the
number of flight hours flown by pilots in each squadron.



















deployed* stand- turnaround and / Battle Group
down workups / operations
** 25% / 85% _/100%/ 120%_/
*** 1 2 10.5 11 13
115! J
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* the phase of the cycle
** the % of actual PMR funding for the squadron
*** the month during the cycle.
The CNAL cycle was presented to the author in a more
rigid format than the CNAP cycle, with funding for the
Fallon detachment set at a specific level.
Figure 2-1 CNAP/CNAL PMR Funding for FY1987
deployed squadrons at 115% of PMR, the TYCOMs are required
to remain within the overall funding level for the
community. The squadrons are therefore susceptible to
flight hour allotment adjustments during all phases of their
non-deployed status.
2. CNAL and CNAP Differences
Squadrons are also susceptible to different PMR
funding levels because their geographic location. In Figure
2-1, the first month a squadron returned home from cruise, a
CNAP squadron was funded at 30% of its PMR or approximately
7.5 hours per month per aircrew. A CNAL squadron was funded
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for 25% of its PMR or 6.25 hours per month per aircrew.
These differences in percentages of PMR funding reflect the
different policies and needs of the Type Commanders on
either coast. For example, a two-week, Airwing detachment
to Naval Air Station Fallon, conducted by both TYCOM' s was
scheduled specifically during the tenth month of the cycle
for the East coast squadrons, while West coast squadrons
were more flexible in the planning of this training
opportunity.
The cycle PMR rates for the 18 month models
presented above are 96.6% for CNAP and 92.4% for CNAL. In
other words, for the cycle, pilots would be programmed for
434.7 and 415.8 hours of flight time respectively. The loss
of between 15 and 30 hours from the 450 hour goal is not
evenly spread across the cycle. Both TYCOMs fund the six
month deployment equally; the funding levels for the other
twelve months of non-deployed flight status then become
87.5% for CNAP and 83.5% for CNAL (262.5 and 250.5 hours for
the twelve non-deployed months instead of 300 hours)
.
The 100% PMR flight hour requirement of 25 hours per
month for a TACAIR/ASW aviator when multiplied by the
percentage of PMR actually funded in FY 1987 produced the
following results. In terms of flight hours, the aircrew
would receive an average of 21.9 hours per month in the
Pacific fleet or 20.9 hours per month in the Atlantic fleet
during their non-deployed months. For FY 1987, Navy wide,
15
the fighter aviators flew an average of 21.79 hours per
month, including those deployed. [Hughes, 1988]
3. CNAP PMR Policy
CNAP
stand- turn- work-ups deployed
down around
0% /_30%_/ 78% / 100% / 115% /
12 4 7 13 19
Figure 2-2 CNAP PMR Funding for FY1988
Because the deployed flying hour average exceeds 25
hours per month (it is programmed for 115% of 25 hours) the
management problem for the rest of the program is more
acute. Therefore, it is important to understand how the
planning and funding for a squadron during the cycle is
arranged in order to appreciate the impact of specific cuts
in the PMR.
In Figure 2-2, the first month of the cycle is
unfunded. The next two months are funded at 3 0% of the PMR,
equating to 7.5 hours per aircrew per month for those two
months. Given the squadrons are funded by the quarter, this
means that the average aircrew will fly 5.0 hours per month
of the first quarter of its cycle in FY1988. Presently,
even during the unfunded months, the planes and aircrews do
not stop flying. Maintenance requirements and the need for
"Check hops" or quality assurance test flights remain. The
16
remainder of the schedules are computed similarly; if
monthly changes occur, they can be spread across the
appropriate quarter.
Projected levels for FY1989 are shown in Figure 2-3.
At this point, the FY89 percentages are subject to the
fluctuations that will arise due to the budgetary process
and are only projections based upon available information.
CNAP
stand- turn-
down around work-ups deployed
25% / 75% / 100% _/ 115% /
1 4 7 13 19
Figure 2-3 CNAP PMR Funding for FY1989
(Projected) [CNAP 019, 1988]
Actual squadron hours and funding are derived from
the CNO Operations Plan 20 (OP 20) guidance in the following
manner. Within the TACAIR/ASW program it is assumed that
the cycle of any squadron can be reasonably determined
through the use of the schedules presented. As each phase
is given a percentage factor (derived from the OP-20 as
shown in Figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3) with which to modify the
PMR, the following formula is used to determine the hour and
dollar allocation for a particular squadron:
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BA * PMR * Phase Factor
where BA equals the number of aircrew allowed [CNAP, 1988].
This number includes an Aircrew Manning Factor
(AMF) , a factor multiplied by the basic Crew/Seat ratio to
arrive at the actual number of aircrew allowed per squadron.
[OP-2 0, 1988] The AMF is a single number applied
consistently to all aircraft TMS in the Navy's inventory.
[McDonnell, March 1988] For instance, if the allowance for
aircrew per aircraft were designed to be 1.25 and there were
12 aircraft per squadron, then the average squadron would
have 15 aircrews. In the case of the F-14 that would equal
3 people as it is a two seat aircraft. However, the Navy
has decided to man the squadrons at less than 100% of the
recommended crew/seat ratio. A factor of .95 for example,
is then multiplied by the crew/seat ratio (C/S R) and the
resultant number, the "BA," is then deemed the 100% manning
requirement for the squadron. It is the BA (0.95(C/S R) )
which is multiplied by the PMR, and then the phase
percentage (arrived at from the OP-2 0) , in order to achieve
the phase hour allotment per squadron of each squadron type.
The aggregate of these hour requirements is then combined
with the computed cost per hour to arrive at an overall




Cost Per Hour Computations and Their Use
The cost per hour data are derived from the
squadrons' submission of the Budget OPTAR Report (BOR) which
report obligations by fund code for each month. The BOR
provides the following information:
1. Obligations for aircraft operations and maintenance;
2. Appropriate Aircraft Equipment Codes;
3. Number of operating aircraft assigned;
4. Total gallons of fuel consumed for the month;
5. Total flight hours flown for the month.
The type commanders then compile the data and submit
them to CNO for preparation of the yearly budget for
dollars, hours and expected costs per hour [CNAP, 1988].
The result, which emanates from the office of CNO, is the
OP-20.
Once the total requirement is prepared, it is
submitted to the office of the Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) . A NAVCOMPT budget analyst reviews it for
defendability and justification. It then proceeds to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and is reviewed as part
of the DoN budget. Throughout this process dollars and
programs are adjusted and must be justified through the
reclama process in order to prevent their loss. The
resulting budgetary request goes to the Office of the
President for submission, review and approval by Congress.
When the funds work their way back to the Type Commanders,
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they are compared to the requirements of the fleet; and the
PMR percentages planned in the OP-20 for that fiscal year
are adjusted accordingly. [McDonnell, May 1988]
5. The OP-2
OP-2 0' s are published for a period covering the
execution year, the POM year, and the following three
planning years. The entire report can be expected to be
revised at least three times during the year. The first
iteration is in January, and is designated the Congressional
Final. The second is produced in June, and is designated
the POM OP-2 0. The third is produced in September and
called the NAVCOMPT Final. Changes can appear in any of the
five OP-20s during any of the three printings. The OP-20 is
not considered stable until the Congressional Final is
published for the execution year. [CNAP 019, 1988]
When the execution year's Congressional Final
funding figures are made available they are compared to the
funding plans of the Type Commanders. If necessary,
adjustments are made to balance the flight hours planned to
the available funds, or the unconstrained requirements are
noted and additional funds are requested through the chain
of command. [McDonnell, May 1988]
The planning document that is available for TACAIR/ASW
is a schedule of the overall OP-20. This schedule includes
all the tactical aircraft identified by TMS with the
following information and computations: the number of
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aircraft, the crew to seat ratios, the total number of
crews, an Aircrew Manning Factor, the Required
hours/crew/month, the Total Mission Requirements, the Total
Mission Hours, the TMS cost per hour, the total costs
required and budgeted, the resulting budgeted hours/
month/crew, and the percent of required hours funded. The
following presents a detailed description of each block of
information on the OP-20. A sample of the OP-20 is provided
in Table 2-1.
1. TMS—the type, model and series of a designated
aircraft.
2. Number of Aircraft—the total number of that TMS for
the FY.
3. Crew Seat Ratio—Number of crews assigned to each
aircraft.
4. Number of Crews— #2 * #3 (number of crews required)
5. AMF—the % of aircrews on board as budgeted by the OP-
20.
6. Req. Hours/Crew/Month—PMR.
7. Total Mission Req. Hours— #4 * #6 * 12.
8. Total Hours— #7 * #5 (Total Hours Required).
9. Total Hours Budgeted—determined by OPNAV.
10. Cost per Hour—taken from the source OP-2 0.
11. Total Cost Req.— #8 * #10.
12. Total Cost Budgeted— #9 * #10.
13. Budgeted Hours/Month/Crew~#9/12/ (#4 * #5).





TMS No. of C/S R No. of AMF Req. H/C/M Tot. Miss.
Aircft Aircrw Reg. Hrs.
**F14A 100 1.25 125 .95 25 37500
* 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Tot. Hrs. Tot. Hrs CPH Total Cost Budgeted % of Req.
Required Budgeted Reg. Bud. H/M/C Hrs . Fund
** 35725# 32063## 10 3572500 3206300 22.5 .89749
* Numbers above catagories correspond to block
numbers in the text on page 21.
** Numbers found on this line are for illustration
only. Any resemblance to actual figures is
coincidental
.
# This number represents 125 aircrew * .95 * 12
months.
## This number reflects block 8 with a theoretical
10% cut in funding.
By subtracting the amount found in block 14 of this OP-2 0,
from 100%, the percentage of funding shortfall can be
determined for each TMS.
C. SUMMARY
If dollars relate to readiness and the PMR is the
average number of hours required to keep an average aircrew
proficient in its primary mission area, then the percentage
shortfall in funding should relate to a shortfall in the
average aircrew's performance. This thesis explores the
22
concept of dollars and readiness and presents some
alternatives for reducing the effect of present and future
budgetary constraints in order to better manage the flight
hour programs for fighter squadrons with the remaining
resources.
This chapter described the process for funding the
Aviation community and maintaining its level of readiness.
The following chapters will explore the problems inherent in
the present funding process and look at problems to be faced
in the event of future financial cuts.
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III. EFFECTIVENESS. EFFICIENCY AND SAFETY
This chapter focuses on the Flight Hour Program and
effectiveness and efficiency measures that could be used to
evaluate it. A discussion of effectiveness and efficiency
is presented. The chapter also addresses the flight hours
in relation to the Navy's safety records and pilot mishap
trend data.
A. EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS AND COST
It is extremely difficult to define measures for
determining the effectiveness of our nation's defense forces
in peace time. One way is to accept that the forces are
effective if the country faces no immediate threat to its
physical security. "As the State Department might put it,
the main military objective of the United States is to deter
attacks on the nation's vital interests." [Kaufman, 198 6, p.
59] Likewise, it is difficult to determine its efficiency
with any type of cost-benefit analysis since the benefits
are difficult to define and measure. The measure of benefit
for training and furnishing the forces with the most
advanced equipment is best determined when the force is
engaged in a combat situation.
1. Primary Mission (s) and Their Funding
The Navy must answer to efficiency experts and
effectiveness evaluators in the government and in the media.
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The PMRs and Flight Hour Programs have been able to provide
a benchmark and a reporting and documentation system that
demonstrate both effectiveness and efficiency. [Lewis,
February 1988; McDonnell, February 1988] Squadrons are not
single-mission oriented. The TYCOMs must address the
problem of having squadrons which perform multiple "Primary
Missions," complicating the managerial problem of providing
financial resources to any primary mission area. It must be
noted here that although the TYCOMs provide the funds to the
squadron and set the training guidelines, it is the squadron
commander who ultimately insures that his squadron meets all
the requirements imposed by his TYCOM. It is ultimately the
squadron commander whose decisions determine how and when to
accomplish these requirements.
In the fighter community, "Primary Missions" include
flying off, on, and around the carrier, extended range
intercepts of hostile missiles or missile carrying bombers
in an environment of electronic warfare, strike escort,
engaging other, sometimes more maneuverable aircraft in a
"dogfight" scenario, and conducting high-speed, low-level
reconnaissance and photographic missions. During peacetime,
accomplishing the "mission" equates to completing the
required training or training mission.
Choices among programs and mission areas are made in
response to changes in the funding levels. Since the amount
of flying hours available to the Navy is finite, it can be
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argued that in the present budgetary environment, cutbacks
or complete deletion due to additional budgetary constraints
will have to be made. Those making the choices will need to
be able to identify not only the relative tactical impor-
tance of each training evolution but the cost of each one as
well. In an interview, RAdm. J. Best stated that, "A
prioritizing of functions is necessitated if the cut to
funds is certain." [Best, 1988] At the present time, a
cost per training mission data base does not exist.
Different missions cost different dollar amounts. As cuts
or increases in the budget are made, there are no data
available to allocate resources among missions.
Additionally, a mission cost system would provide to the
operators, managers and the budgeteers a means to analyze
the impact of the funding changes and provide a more
detailed justification for funding requests.
2 . Congressional Requirements
Points and Michelson (1984) describe the financial
structure and procedures of the federal government as
providing "information useful in assessing management's
performance and stewardship." [Points and Michelson, 1984,
p. 133] They delineate three specific areas where the
assessments are directed; fiscal viability, fiscal
compliance, and activity level. [Points and Michelson,
1984, p. 134] These can be described as the ability to
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maintain a requisite level of service within the law in a
manner which is measurable in some way.
Kaufman points out that the Congressional Budget
Office measures and assesses the military's management and
stewardship, by examining four main determinants of defense
capability: force structure, modernization, readiness, and
sustainability. [Kaufman, 1986, p. 41]
DEFENSE CAPABILITY
FORCE STRUCTURE MODERNIZATION READINESS SUSTAINABILITY
Figure 3-1 Determinants of Capability
The managers of the Navy's funds, including the
Squadron Commanders who must determine how much and in what
areas his pilots require training, are evaluated by their
accomplishment of the determinants delineated by Kaufman
within the areas of assessment described by Points and
Michelson. Their performance, and subsequently, the Navy's,
is measured by how efficiently they provide the requisite
levels of effectiveness of the four determinants.
3 . Measuring the Flight Hour Program
The cornerstone of all the Naval Air Force's
operations, the Flight Hour Program provides the planners
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and operators in the Navy with a system to provide the
readiness input into the defense capability equation. As
discussed previously, a question now facing the Navy is the
adequacy of the Flight Hour Program. The question can be
posed as follows: Should the program attempt to maximize
the effectiveness of the force for a given cost or should it
try to minimize the cost to maintain a given level of
effectiveness?
4 . The Best Measure. Effectiveness or Efficiency
A generic definition of effectiveness is the level
at which a program produces an output to accomplish an
intended effect. The PMR program has over the course of
time arrived at a figure of 25 hours per pilot per month as
an amount required to provide the output of an adequate and
reasonable defense. As noted earlier, during a normal cycle
of operation, a pilot will receive less than the 25 hours
per month. A pilot presently is funded to receive 25 hours
for a period just prior to his becoming operational (or for
our purposes, deployed) and in excess of that when he is in
the operational environment. This program of adjusting the
PMR is recognized to cause fluctuations in a pilot's
effectiveness. [Best, 1988] Also, it is understood that
100 percent rating across all programs at all times would be
nearly impossible to achieve at any cost, as depicted in a
typical cost to effectiveness graph (Figure 3-2) . As the


















Figure 3-2 Generic Cost Effectiveness Graph
[Murray, 1986]
achieving that effectiveness rises at a much greater rate.
In this case it would be because of the demands placed upon
the pilot due to: (a) the number of different missions he
is required to fly, (b) his ability to perform at a 100%
rating in each of them, (c) the increased utilization of the
airframe in highly stressful environments, and (d) the
increased number of hours required to achieve higher
performance rating levels. Additionally, pilot turnover and
currency qualifications contribute to the implausibility of
100 percent mission readiness.
The efficiency question in military decisions is
addressed at length by Hitch and McKean (1960). They point
out that rather than using efficiency in the vague and
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general sense of "making good use," a more precise
definition would be an inability to produce one more unit of
output without sacrificing another. [Hitch and McKean,
1960, p. 109]
It can be argued that both a concern for military
economic efficiency and military effectiveness produce the
same end result in our system of government.
The Military services always (and properly) want more;
the economizers always (and also properly) offer
resistance, or try to impose reductions. But once the
budget has been determined, there is no longer conflict of
interest.
In fact choices that maximize military capability for
a given budget are the same choices that minimize the cost
of attaining that capability. [Hitch and McKean, 1960, p.
124]
The result, therefore, is a budget which is
considered by those who devise it, to be both efficient and
effective.
5. The Budget as a Given and Its Result
For a Fighter Squadron executing the requirements
for an effective fighter force, the budget is a relatively
external constraint. Once the budget is decided upon, the
Navy has to live within it, and although minor changes can
be effected, the farther down the fiscal chain of command an
organization is, the less chance that organization has of
altering the funding levels. Therefore, the concern becomes
making the program fit within the financial constraints set
from above.
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B. READINESS AND ITS MEASURE
1. Status of Resources and Training Systems
Of the four measures or determinants of defensive
capability, the main area of concern in this paper is
readiness. Of the numerous types of readiness reports
prepared throughout the chain of command, the primary method
for reporting unit level readiness is the Status of
Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) report. [NWP 10-1-
11A] This internal Department of Defense report contains
the information used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to
monitor the status of all military units. Readiness is
reported in the form of a combat or "C" rating. These
alphanumerics represent, in general terms, the ability of a
particular unit to perform its wartime tasking by measuring
its peacetime level of the following items: Personnel,
Equipment and Supplies on board, Equipment Condition, and
most importantly for this paper, Training. The training
portion of the SORTS report is designed to examine whether a
unit has fulfilled its training and turnaround program
requirements and has attained its required mission readiness
level. Individual crew training requirements are compared
to their actual mission accomplishment rate and their
qualification currency.
The following is a list of the ratings and their
associated explanations:
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CI Fully Combat Ready
C2 Substantially Combat Ready
C3 Marginally Combat Ready
C4 Not Combat Ready
C5 Programmed Not Combat Ready.
The SORTS highlights potential problem areas in
readiness and training for briefings and preparation of
external reports by higher level organizations within the
Department of Defense (such as CNO or JCS) . Although it is
not to be used as an external report, organizations down to
the squadron level rely on it to accurately represent their
level of readiness. [NWP 10-1-11A]
C. EFFECTIVENESS EFFICIENCY AND READINESS
Although the Flight Hour Program has provided the
benchmark for determining the average effectiveness level of
the pilots in the Navy and funding for the achievement of
that level, hours alone may not be the best indicators of
the effectiveness of a pilot.
1. Is Every Hour Like the Next?
As a case in point, a Fighter squadron may not let a
pilot be a section leader until he has 500 hours. But a
squadron commander also looks at the proficiency of the
individual in question. How were the 500 hours achieved?
How effective a section leader would he be with only 500
hours? The more important calculation would be the
successful completion of mission areas such as Air to Air
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gunnery, participation in a certain number of multi-plane
intercepts and Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM, "dogfight")
flights, and other mission areas in order to achieve the
required degree of proficiency for such a rating. It is not
just the fact that a pilot has 500 hours that qualifies him
for section leader designation.
The same holds true for the Flight Hour Program.
Hours alone may not be sufficient for setting funding
allowances. As the fiscal constraints grow tighter and
available funds dwindle, hard choices are going to have to
be made. Cutting hours to save dollars will be a necessary
requirement. The question now becomes, where? Where do
those hours that are being deleted come from? What mission
areas will maintain more of their original allotment?
Which missions are more "Primary" than others?
At present, the Flight Hour Program and PMR are used
to represent the requirements for funding calculations but
do not reflect the nuances of each training mission in
either cost per hour or relative tactical importance nor
changes in Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) . These problems are
addressed in the following chapters.
D. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Between 1977 and 1985, aircraft mishaps in Naval
Aviation cost the government 1.7 billion dollars. This does
not include the related costs of things such as survivor's
benefits, litigation brought against the Department of the
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Navy, or the full replacement cost of the destroyed
aircraft. There were 400 fatalities associated with those
losses including 173 pilots [CNSC, 1986] . In 1986 the Navy
lost another 71 aircraft and incurred 60 fatalities. In
1987, another 74 aircraft and 66 lives were lost. By June
of 1988, 22 aircraft had been totally destroyed and another
2 had been severely damaged with 19 pilot and aircrew
fatalities. The total dollar figure since the start of 1986
stands at over 1.4 billion dollars. [Aviation Weekly Safety
Summary, January 1987, January 1988]
Every year, the Navy publishes its list of aircraft
accidents, included in the list is the TMS of the aircraft,
the severity of the damage to the airframes and the severity
of injury to the aircrew. The Commander, Naval Safety
Center (NSC) keeps an inventory of numerous factors
contributing or suspected to have contributed to the
accidents.
Studies conducted by the Naval Safety Center and
published in APPROACH magazine associate flight hours with
accident rates. High risk flight time categories for pilots
are shown in Figure 3-1. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 represent the
class A mishap rates as broken down by the categories in
Figure 3-1. Class A mishaps represent those accidents in
which the aircraft was lost or destroyed. A review of these












* of flying in all types of aircraft
Source: [CNSC, 1986] (compiled from APPROACH
issues of November, 1984 and January,
1985)
Figure 3-1 High Risk Window for Jet Aircraft Pilots
One of the areas studied by the Safety Center is the
relationship between an individual's total and in-type
flight hours and the percentage of accidents which occur in
certain groupings of pilots both by mission and by blocks of
flight hours. Although no definitive study has been
conducted, the data from safety records continues to be
compiled. Analysis of this data could provide information
useful in highlighting safety problems with aircrew in
various hour groups and mission areas.
The data in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 present evidence that
the overall rate of pilot error mishaps decreases as the
pilots acquire more flight experience. As budget cutbacks
likely will effect not only a decrease in monthly flying
hours, but the overall experience levels of career pilots,



































































This table shows that pilots with greater than 750 total
flight hours and more than 300 hours in type have a lower
accident rate than the population average. Although the
data do not show a smooth decline in accident rates as a
pilot in this category gains more hours, a decrease in the
rate does occur between the initial hour blocks and the
final ones.
Source: [CNSC, 1986, p. 9]
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TABLE 3-2






























































Rate per 100,000 Hrs
This table shows that the error rate for pilots with
over 750 total hours and over 500 hours in type is lower
than the average for the population. Total pilot hours show
a significant decrease in accident rate as the pilots cross
over the 450 hour mark for total flight hours. The trend
for hours in tyep shows a steady decrease in the accident
rate.
Source: [CNSC, 1986, p. 12]
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As the pilots fly fewer hours, the high
vulnerability "windows" depicted in Figure 3-1 will extend
over a longer portion of any one individual's career and
expose that individual to higher risk for a greater amount
of time. By stretching out the total number of hours
individuals will fly, the familiarity of the pilots to their
task environments will suffer. The maximum time a pilot
should fly is not addressed in this thesis, as it is only
concerned with the minimum level issue. There are limits to
both ends of the flight hour spectrum however, and the Naval
Aviation community recognizes this by setting maximum flight
hour limits as well. For single-piloted aircraft, that
limit is 65 hours per 30 days or 195 hours per 90 days. In
order to legally exceed the maximum, a physical examination
must be performed by a Flight Surgeon and a waiver
granted. [OPNAV, July 1987]
Another result of reducing flight hours of aircrew
is the reduction of the level of experience for Training
Command (TRACOM) and FRS instructors if they are chosen from
the same groups of post operational tour aircrew as they are
now.
One important area to note is the finding that
pilots in the initial portion of their first tour experience
very high accident rates. Again one should note that these
mishaps occur during the time generally when the pilot is in
his peak vulnerability window. An extension of that window
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will place the pilot into a vulnerable position for a longer
portion of his first operational tour.
The results of the compiled data demonstrate a
relationship between the number of flight hours flown and
the number of mishaps. Specifically for Fighter/TACAIR
Dual Seat (the general description of the F-14) squadrons
pilot error rates were related to total hours. The rate
decreased as pilots received more hours in model, particu-
larly if their total number of flight hours were less than
750. These pilots were rated to have a high to extremely
high accident rates in comparison to those with more
specific model experience. [CNSC, 1986]
One interesting phenomenon which might occur due to
a cutback in the number of flight hours is that the level of
accidents both in terms of rate and severity may very well
decrease due to the reactions of pilots experiencing fewer
than normal flying hours. An argument can be made for this
because of the increased attention to safety of flight items
that could occur because of the decrease in familiarity with
the flying environment. As the hours available go down and
the level of experience of pilots decreases, attention must
be paid to maintaining the level of realism in training
which, if reduced, could cause dramatically negative results
in the event of actual conflict. In an effort to get the
most out of each flight, "training like you'll fight" is an
age old adage which needs to be practiced as well as
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preached. Squadron commanders must be even more acutely
aware of the dangers facing their pilots due to decreased
hours and structure their squadron training syllabi to not
only reflect the requirements of the Training and Readiness
syllabus but to ensure even more than before the aspects of
safety in every flight. It is the responsibility of all
concerned in the process to maintain the highest level of
readiness possible, whatever the funding level. If due to
the cut in funds, the readiness level might suffer, it is
the responsibility of all concerned to minimize the damage
caused by the funding cuts.
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IV. OPERATORS. MANAGERS AND PROBLEMS DISCUSSED
Joshua Ronen (1975) discusses the function of budgets in
decision making on the part of both superiors and
subordinates in an organization. He states, "Viewed as a
whole then, budgets constitute both constraints and
opportunities." [Ronen, 1975] It can be argued that the
present environment of a declining resource base provides
the greatest budget constraints faced by Naval personnel and
managers during the past decade. This chapter presents the
results of interviews of Naval personnel concerning changes
to the budget and managing the funds remaining for flight
hours, flying, and simulators.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first
section presents a general discussion of the operational
environment. The second section discusses the conduct of
the interviews and a description of the overall response to
issues discussed. The third section presents discussions of
cost per hour computations, simulators, and safety and
operational needs compiled from interviews with aircrew and
CNAP personnel. The fourth section presents a set of topics
specifically addressed by CNAP budgeting staff and planners
during the course of their interviews, including a
discussion of Permanent Change of Station problems. The
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fifth section presents the results of discussions with
senior Naval aircrew personnel.
A. THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DISCUSSED
It has often been pointed out by Department of Defense
critics in the Congress that the cost of our technologically
complex present day military hardware is extremely high.
This is a result of the nation opting for a strategy of
being technologically advanced than superior in numbers in
relation to the opposition super-powers. The nation
provides its forces with armaments that are on the leading
edges of technology. [PBS, 1988] For example, U.S. Air
Forces in NATO are expected to achieve at least a four to
one Kill Ratio just to stay even with their adversaries.
[PBS, 1988] The F-14 is designed to carry a weapon system
that can engage up to six targets at one time at long range.
Implicit in such an approach to defense is the assumption
that the hardware and the people operating it are expected
to perform much better than their counterparts, and not just
adequately. To ensure exceptional performance, training is
necessary. Numerous articles, Change of Command speeches,
and testimony before Congress and the nation's press have
stressed the need for an aggressive flying program [Taylor,
Spring 1988] and for the Armed Forces to train like they'll
fight. [PBS, 1988]
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B. THE CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEWS
Taking the "train for fighting" view into consideration,
39 Naval Aviation personnel were interviewed to gain an
understanding of how they might react to varying levels of
budget cuts and resultant losses of monthly flight hours. A
breakdown of these personnel by rank is presented in Table
4-1. Interviews of flight personnel other than Commanding
Officers and more senior personnel were conducted at random
but were not the result of a statistically random survey.
The sample interviewed is a convenience sample. The sample
was limited to Pacific Fleet personnel and Naval Aviation
Safety School students.
Without hesitation, the immediate response of all
concerned was that they would accept the cuts and continue
on as best they could to operate the program with the
resources available. However, decreasing monthly flight
hours was seen as an inappropriate way to save the necessary
dollars. Taken as a group, those interviewed felt that the
present allocation of flight hours was barely sufficient to
conduct adequate, and more importantly, realistic flight
training. [Lewis, March 1988]
C. A REVIEW OF NAVAL AVIATION CONCERNS
1. Cost Per Hour or Costs Per Hour?
For aircrews to "train like they fight," they
require an appropriate amount of flight hours. Identifying
the cost per hour of flight is an important (possibly the
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most important) factor in developing the budget for the
Naval Air Forces. The budgeted cost per hour of flight
results in the number of hours allotted to any particular
squadron. Fluctuations or misstatement of the cost per hour
provide an inappropriate number of hours.
At the present time, the Cost per Hour data are
arrived at by dividing by type, the total number of hours
flown for any one period into the total dollars spent for
that period. This method can lead to misapportionment of
funds. Differences occur in flight hours achieved by
different squadrons on different coasts, and even different
squadrons on the same coast. The different coast problem is
explained by the different distances aircraft from each
coast must fly to reach the same types of training ranges.
[Lewis, January 1988] Different hours on the same coast
occur because of numerous factors including OPTEMPO, cycle
phase, mission type, refueling method, or amount of training
in any one area that a Commander deems necessary for his
pilots. As an example, a Squadron Commander may see the
need for some of his pilots to complete more flights than
normal in carrier landing practice (FCLP's), an extremely
high fuel usage type of flying, while a second squadron
spends a lot of time practicing high altitude, long range
intercepts for Fleet Air Defense (FAD) scenarios. The
latter squadron might use less fuel per hour and not put
nearly the same amount of stress on the airframe as the
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constant landings and take-offs required in FCLP's. These
squadrons might spend the same amount of dollars, but the
flight time accumulated by the second would be different and
higher than that of the first. An inequitable split in
flight hours occurs. This scenario is not designed to argue
the relative merits of FCLP's and FAD flights but is
presented to illustrate the need for more detailed cost per
hour figures.
2 . Mission Loading
An opinion voiced by over half of those interviewed
was that additional missions are seemingly added to the
mission loads without cost impact considerations. A
corollary is that back-up, or temporary fixes to problems
tend to become permanent mission design changes. As an
example, more than half of the F-14 aircrew interviewed
stated that the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
(TARPS) , which has been incorporated into the F-14 to back
up the photographic capabilities of the RA 5C, RF 4 and RF
8, has now replaced them. This has not only increased the
mission role, but has put a severe strain on the training
program which is limited by the number of hours that any one
pilot can practice any one mission area.
Additional training is required for pilots and
aircrew who fly TARPS missions. Individuals must not only
acquaint themselves with the mission, but in the case of the
TARPS, experience the different handling characteristics of
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the aircraft (due to hardware additions to the aircraft)
before being required to do it in a hostile environment. A
similar argument can be made for the addition of external
fuel tanks to deployed squadron aircraft. [Lewis, March
1988]
Each of the interviewees stressed that it is not
that they do not want to do the missions. Rather, they want
their best effort at performing any mission to culminate in
a favorable result. Some stated that even with 100 percent
of their aircraft's PMR flight hour requirement accom-
plished, they still feel "'heavily tasked at some points of
the mission.'" [Taylor, Spring 1988]
The interviewees ' comments provide some indication
of the more general observation that the single-mission
dedicated aircraft for the Navy is becoming a thing of the
past. With the planned development of multi-mission capable
aircraft, a more definitive and tailored programming of
flight hours will be required to maintain an adequate level
of expertise in each TACAIR community.
3 . Simulators
An opinion shared by all of the interviewees was
that there is no training like actual experience.
Discussions concerning Flight Trainers or simulators
produced a mix of views that included both positive and
negative comments (some within the same statement) such as:
"It's a great aid, but it just doesn't fly like the real
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thing" or "Great for procedures but no real pucker factor."
A previous Safety Officer commented, "I love them, you can
make all your mistakes there and live to learn from them."
Senior and junior aviators alike demonstrated their concern
for both the number and level of sophistication of the
trainers with statements like: "I can't get enough time.
They're booked solid," and, "There aren't enough of them
and although they are pretty great, they could be even
better if we'd spend some more money on them."
Both Admiral Best and Admiral Taylor noted that
trainer utilization was at a maximum, given the amount of
time required for maintenance and the funding constraints of
their operation. They agreed that there is a need for
additional simulators although they also acknowledge two
important limitations inherent to the trainers. [Best,
1988; Taylor, May 1988] First, simulators are expensive.
The development of hardware and software, the construction
of the physical plant to house them, the associated cost to
maintain the structures, and the personnel costs to run and
maintain these systems all become issues of importance in
the budget.
Second, simulators give an opportunity to practice
procedure but do not, and never were intended to, replace
the experience derived from actual flight. As a case in
point, no matter how realistic the environmental factors are
recreated in the machine, actual "G" force has not yet nor
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probably ever will be truly simulated. Such limitations are
the subject of on-going studies for increasing simulator
realism to provide a more accurate "flying" experience. The
aircrews interviewed did not feel that simulation could ever
replace the experience gained from actual flight. It is for
such reasons that the aircrew believed that simulators
should not be considered as an equivalent replacement for
the flight hours lost to budgetary cuts.
4 . Safety and Operational Needs
One concern voiced by more than half of the 11
squadron Safety Officers interviewed was a fear that if
flight hours per pilot were cut there would be a rise in the
rate if not the actual number of accidents. A counter to
that argument expressed by the others was that if pilots
were experiencing a cut back in their familiarity with their
aircraft, more thorough preflight planning would be
conducted, flight safety would play a more important role in
the entire evolution of a flight, and the accident rate
would go down. During the first six months of CY88 the
total number of accidents in the Navy has been lower than
the CY87 Year to Date (22 accidents and a rate of 2.40 per
100,000 flight hours for 1988 versus 29 accidents and a rate
of 3.11 per 100,000 flight hours for 1987). [Aviation
Weekly Safety Summary, May 1988]
A majority of the Safety Officers interviewed agreed
that pilots as a whole might raise their personal standards
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for safety of flight that could result in individuals
lowering their aggressiveness during training, and possibly
causing higher attrition rates when called upon to perform
in a hostile environment if the flight hours continued to be
cut.
Examples of comments made by aviators concerning
flight hour cutbacks and their effect on aggressiveness and
training included the following:
1. "Guys would pull only five G's instead of six and a
half."
2. "No one would press the edge of the envelope. . .the
plane's or their own."
3. "It'd take a lot longer to get quailed to fight below
10,000 feet."
4. "How am I supposed to stay quailed if they give me
less than what they said the minimum was in the first
place?"
Admiral Taylor noted that, "...F-14 pilots did not average
(even) 20 hours/month for the (past) year." [Taylor,
Spring, 1988] A letter from a pilot in the Indian Ocean
contained the following statement, "'...when the average
hours/month drops below 25, the ability to employ our
sophisticated machines declines rapidly. And the scary part
is the relationship is not linear, especially below 20 hours
per month.'" [Taylor, Spring 1988]
D. FLIGHT HOUR PROGRAM ISSUES ADDRESSED BY CNAP
During interviews with CNAP staff a number of issues
were discussed. The majority of discussions centered on a
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1987 point paper in which the Force Comptroller of CNAP
outlined three specific areas of consideration for changes
to the present Flight Hour Program. They are: (1) the
introduction of OPTEMPO, (2) the elimination of the Aircrew
Manning Factor, and (3) the decoupling of the TACAIR and ASW
requirements for funding purposes. [Waggoner, 1987] A
fourth area, the potential issues concerning Permanent
Change of Station policy, was also addressed during the
interviews.
The present method of funding is based on a combination
of factors such as force level, number of crews required,
the PMR, and the AMF, but this funding method does not
accurately depict the actual requirements placed on the
system. OPTEMPO, the first area mentioned above, is not
included as a factor in the computations for the OP-2 0. In
FY 1987, a 15 million dollar shortfall was experienced
because of increased OPTEMPO for the Pacific Fleet forces.
[Waggoner, February 1988]
The second planning factor discussed by the CNAP report,
the Aircrew Manning Factor, was designed to provide a
calculation method to properly reflect the number of
aircrews budgeted per aircraft per squadron in the OP-20.
For FY 1987 it was equal to 95.5%. The actual manning level
for TACAIR overall, was 97.46%. [McDonnell, March 1988]
Deployed squadrons were and are today manned at 100%. This
exacerbates the gap between funding and manning. During the
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period when squadrons are deployed, they are funded to
reflect a 115% PMR flight hour rate, but they are also over-
manned when the AMF is considered. The combination of
funding and manning levels causes the number of flight hours
flown per pilot to be less than the number of flight hours
funded since there are more pilots than planned for in the
squadron at that time. To achieve an overall manning level
of 97.4 6%, squadrons during their standdown and turnaround
cycles were permitted to drop below "combat ready" personnel
levels.
The segments of the cycle when the squadrons attempt to
offset the 100% manning level of deployment, and achieve the
95.5% overall rate occur during the low funded (through PMR
percentage shortfalls) periods. [McDonnell, March 1988]
However, they also coincide with the periods when a squadron
is least likely to be called up for an emergency deployment.
In any case, if a squadron were to drop below a 100% manning
level while deployed, for whatever reason, the squadron
would be auqmented to a 100% manning level to insure that it
would be able to meet all of its commitments.
The third planning factor discussed in the point paper
is concerned with completely decoupling TACAIR from ASW
requirements for funding purposes. The ideal funding level
for TACAIR and ASW in the Flight Hour Program is set at 2 5
hours per crew per month. It is argued that this is not
reflective of the ASW needs and that the 2 5 hour level is
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relevant only for carrier based TAC AIR. [Waggoner, 1987]
The OP 20 reflects the following numbers which provide for
additional hour requirements for the respective aircraft:
VS (S3A aircraft) 32 hours
HS (H3 helicopters) 29 hours
HSL (H2, SH60 helicopters) 30 hours
VP (P3 aircraft) 52 hours
When funding is based on the Flight Hour Program,
TACAIR assets are then drawn down to partially fund the ASW
commitments, cutting further the funds available for TACAIR.
One alternative would be to uncouple the two divisions of
operational flying to more adequately reflect their OPTEMPO
and their need for funds. The fourth area discussed, not
addressed in the point paper, concerns Permanent Change of
Station (PCS) issues. Although it is not part of flight
hour funding, this aspect of manning can cause acute
problems affecting personnel levels directly and flight hour
utilization indirectly.
Due to the continued need for new pilots, the
requirement for personnel rotation into operational tours,
and the extension of personnel in their operational tours
due to a lack of PCS funds, the manning levels of squadrons
may exceed those prescribed by the funding available. This
leads to an even greater gap in flight hours received by a
pilot. For instance, if a squadron is budgeted for 2 hours
per month per pilot, and that budget is for 10 pilots (from
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calculations for AMF) , and another pilot is brought on
board, the 2 00 hours budgeted would now be split by 11
pilots or 18.18 hours per month per pilot. This would cause
additional strain on the already taxed PMR guidelines. An
alternative would then be to scrap the AMF computational
figure and work from the actual manning figures of the
squadrons.
E. SENIOR OFFICER DISCUSSIONS
In discussions with five current and former Commanding
Officers, a scenario of an additional 10 percent cut in
flight hour funding and their reaction to trying to make the
program fit the hours was addressed. The consensus was that
the program, as it is today, would have to be modified to
fit the flight hour constraints. Given that such modifica-
tions might be needed, the question arose as to what method
of time and dollar management they would use to provide the
most effective utilization of the remaining flight hours.
The following presents a review of their ideas and comments.
1. A Review of Specific Suggestions
A system which would break down the mission areas
and cost out each type of mission would be an alternative to
the one presently in place. This could be accomplished with
the preparation of a data base for each type of flight
through more precise post-flight documentation. Information
included from each flight would be: its duration, its fuel
cost and any associated post-flight maintenance costs. This
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data base could be used to program funds and adjust training
schedules in a more detailed manner. With the
computerization of many of the administrative aspects of a
squadron, a program could be devised to permit easy entry of
the above data at a squadron level for computations
conducted at higher levels in the chain of command. This
system should also discriminate missions by a prioritization
of mission area (i.e., basic qualification, advanced
qualification, fleet operational support and other types of
service support)
.
All of the current and former Commanding Officers
interviewed agreed that a prioritized list of mission areas
needs to be formulated for each TMS of aircraft in the Naval
inventory. From this list a schedule of cost per training
hour in each mission area should be developed. From these
two sets of data, the number and duration of training
missions for each TMS could be derived. Fuel loads could
thus be predetermined and flights could be time limited.
The present use of "hot" refueling methods (where
aircraft are refueled while their engines, or at least one
engine, is on or "turning") could be totally eliminated,
saving fuel used by the aircraft while refueling. However,
additional fuel trucks would have to be purchased to make
this a workable alternative at the Master Jet Bases such as
NAS Miramar.
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Aircrews with extensive carrier landing experience,
for example with more than 299 "traps," could have their
field practice requirements significantly reduced, unless
extra flights were deemed necessary by the squadron Landing
Signals Officers (LSO's).
Increase the pro-pay for LSO's. Have all squadron
and Wing LSO's, while shore based during their turn-around
cycles, stand a Field LSO watch. LSO's would be exempt from
standing squadron duties in consideration for their
inclusion in the Field LSO watch bill. The LSOs would grade
each pilot on every night approach and landing.
"Ball calls" (an identifying call made to the LSO's
when a pilot visually acquires the landing aid nicknamed the
"meat ball" because of its appearance) could be modified
around the field to include the squadron number. The grade
would be immediately communicated to the pilot's duty
officer through a phone patch or base station radio A copy
of the grading comments would be made available the
following morning, and debriefs of contested grades could be
handled on a case by case basis. This would continue a
spirit of good natured rivalry and might help to insure that
each pilot would have a continual record of their
performance to catch disturbing trends early. As a result,
the number of flights flown dedicated to Carrier Landing
Practice might be reduced, providing significant savings
over the long run.
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To make the dollars "stretch" across an entire cycle
or fiscal year it was suggested that the squadrons follow
the monthly breakdown of hours actually funded. For the
months that are not funded, the squadrons would be grounded.
There would be no option to fly. In this case the
maintenance and ownership of the aircraft would be shared
with the Fleet Replacement Squadron.
Another suggestion to making the dollars stretch was
to ground each squadron for two months after their return
from deployment. This would enable more intensive training
to be conducted during the flight approved part of the
cycle. Training plans would have to be revised to reflect
the long layoff. However, Admiral Best stated that the
increase in the remaining months flight hour allotments
could be programmed to provide for more intense training to
make up for any loss of skills. [Best, May 1988]
The last idea posed was the tailoring of fuel loads
to the specific missions to be performed, rather than
fueling every flight to the aircraft's maximum capacity.
This idea has already been incorporated into squadrons
'
maintenance procedures whenever feasible. It needs to be
recognized that in many instances, this is not feasible, for
example, (a) when the flight length is not mission dependent
but time dependent or (b) because of last minute changes to
the flight or maintenance schedules.
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F. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the views of many Naval Aviators,
from newly designated pilots and Naval Flight Officers to
Flag Rank Officers in the Aviation community. Observations,
recommendations, methods for implementation and other





This thesis has provided a discussion of the Navy's
Flight Hour Program, how it is funded, and how fluctuations
in that funding can impact Fighter Squadrons in the Pacific
fleet. As of the time of this writing, the Pacific fleet as
well as the rest of the Navy awaits notification of the
degree of budgetary cuts it will face in the coming Fiscal
Year. While awaiting news of next year's budget, the
Comptroller and Operations Officers for CNAP continue to
work with a budget that includes unfunded pay raises and an
actual reduction in operating funds. [Waggoner, March 1988]
This thesis explores what might be done to improve the
Flight Hour Program in order to more ably meet the budgeting
challenge of the future. The object of this thesis is to
stimulate future discussion and action on adjusting the
flying proficiency system for the needs of the future to
maintain readiness.
The thesis has attempted to show the effects of the past
two years ' budgets on flying hours for CNAP Fighter
Squadrons. Additionally, areas discussed included Naval
Aviation Safety, and an overview of fleet level flight
effectiveness and efficiency measures. Comments and ideas
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concerning the present system of maintaining the aviation
community's combat proficiency also have been provided.
Since the early 1960 's, the Navy and the Department of
Defense have experienced major fluctuations in their
funding. During the first half of the 1980' s, the Navy in
particular received a tremendous boost in its growth plan.
This was due to a combination of factors which included: a
strong "pro defense 11 President, a Congress which tended to
agree with him, Secretaries of the Departments of Defense
and the Navy who were extremely successful in presenting
their case before the Congress, and the support of the
general population. At the same time however, the role of
the Navy was increased. It became a "three ocean Navy"
committed to protecting the Nation's interests on at least
three fronts simultaneously.
In 1986, a reduction in defense funding was experienced.
With the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings Act and the
projected budget cuts, military leaders are going to be
faced with even greater economic decisions than they
presently face.
As discussed in the thesis, the overall Navy funding
plan will be developed at a higher level than individual
Fighter Squadrons or even CNAP. The overall budget
guidelines will place an external constraint on the system.
CNAP's role will be the execution of a program of providing
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the best level of aircrew proficiency and operational
training within the given budget.
One method to make the Flight Hour Program fit would be
to eliminate an equal portion of all mission areas. This
however might not reflect the relative importance of one
mission area to another. Individuals interviewed stressed
the need to produce a list of priorities from which to
establish a structured method for determining appropriate
cuts to the program, should the need arise. A base from
which no cuts could be accepted without a reduction in
mission requirement was also cited as necessary.
B. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the archival data reviewed and the interviews
conducted, the following recommendations are directed at the
TYCOM and Squadron level. The evidence provided in this
thesis does not prove either the efficiency or effectiveness
of the following recommendations. However, each recommenda-
tion is based upon the knowledge of experienced aviators.
Before the first three recommendations are implemented,
a detailed cost/benefit study should be conducted. The
fourth recommendation specifically concerns a cost study of
truck refueling aircraft. The fifth recommendation concerns
the continuation and expansion of the program of tailoring
fuel loads to specific needs.
1. Each TMS should have its own flight hour requirements
recognized.
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By recognizing each TMS individually, the Flight Hour
program would more adequately reflect the nuances of each
aircraft's mission. To do this properly each community
should be required to initiate a data base which would
include information such as cost per mission flight hour by
mission type, cost of associated maintenance (including
maintenance support flights) per mission type for each
flight, the number of missions of each mission type flown
per year by coast (in order to recognize the different needs
of the TYCOMs) , and a record of the Combat effectiveness
ratings for each squadron (including time) . Mission codes
provided on reporting documents ("Yellow Sheets") need to be
mission specific and should include codes for performing
multiple missions on any one flight. The subsequent
division of fliqht time could be maintained by the
Operations departments of the individual squadrons and
included in the BORs or SORTS reports. This should provide
a more accurate method of determininq the costs for
performing each mission.
2. A prioritized list of training missions for each TMS
should be developed.
This list should be developed through the cooperation
of Squadron Commanders, Fleet Replacement Squadron
representatives, senior Naval aircrew, Naval Fighter Weapons
School representatives, and the staffs of the Wing
Commanders, Type Commanders and the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) . These listings
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would be different than the current training matrices. The
listings would be produced in conjunction with the cost
information provided according to the previous
recommendation. The new matrices could provide a guideline
for mission training changes or could assist in making
specific level of cutbacks in each mission area depending on
the severity of the budgetary reduction.
3. Establish a program for LSOs to grade night field
approaches, touch and goes, and landings.
Time spent in the landing pattern would be more
effectively used if the pilots were under the external
supervision of an LSO. Each approach and landing would be a
more valuable experience because it would be conducted under
the guidance of an objective observer. The LSOs should
receive additional compensation and be placed on a
rotational Watch Bill as outlined in the thesis.
4. The efficiency of "Cold" or truck refueling of
aircraft should be examined.
This examination should include the costs of obtaining
the new refueling trucks and associated hardware, the
personnel requirements and costs, and the reliance on
another source of funds for its successful implementation
and operation.
5. The tailoring of fuel loads to specific mission
requirements
.
This tailoring of fuel needs to be continued and if
possible increased. Taking deployed and operational
commitments into consideration, alternate methods of fuel
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loading might be explored. One example is to "Hot" refuel
the aircraft after start-up procedures, prior to calling for
take-off instructions, this method might provide cost
beneficial results.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In addition to the issues raised in the previous
section, the following topics that might be researched but
which were beyond the scope of this thesis were identified:
1. Would relating maintenance and support costs (AVDLR)
to operational tempo or measurement factors through
other than an average Cost per Hour provide a more
accurate method of determining funding in this
associated funding area?
2. Is union of the operations cycle to the funding cycle
feasible? Would this provide a more stable financial
base from the standpoint that the two cycles would
then be consistent by___eJ
:
thej^__Jte±tjLng—the—funding
process conform to the operational cycle, or adjusting
the operations cycle to the budget?
3. What would be the effect of grounding squadrons for
two months after their return from cruise? Is it
feasible to ground them in certain mission areas
during specific portions of their cycles? This
research could include development of a plan for
personnel utilization.
4. What is the relationship between flight hours, safety,
and mission readiness? Could specific squadrons have
their flight hours regulated in different mission
areas to test the mission readiness?
5. Do the criteria for the Battle Efficiency Awards
account for the funding differences experienced by
squadrons because of the funding-operational cycle
variations? Are Commanding Officers and their
squadrons penalized by funding changes which could
affect their Combat Effectiveness rating?
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APPENDIX
THE FIGHTER TRAINING MATRIX
The following matrix presents a training schedule for a
typical F-14 squadron in CNAP. An explanation of the matrix
is provided below.
All training events should be completed during the
appropriate periods in order to maintain a 100% Combat ready
status. Points are assigned to various missions and crews
are graded on their completion of the requirements. Within
the matrix are specific requirements for certain flights.
These requirements are found in various publications
maintained by the squadron or the Air Wing. Successful
completion of those requirements is mandatory for a 100%
rating.
Some specific guidelines follow. ACM I through STK
should be completed in order. CAP I through CAP/EW VII and
STK may be completed at night. MAS flights should be
completed in order. Simulators may be used to complete MAS
requirements. Fleet Fighter Refresher Training satisfies
all ACM and up to CAP IV. Credit for FCLP flights is







ACM I FOUR 1V1 SIM./DISIM. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
ACM II TWO 2V2 VIS. FLTS. ONE OF THE SAME Q +45D
CAP I TWO 2V UNK. FLTS. SAME Q + 45D
CAP/ FOUR 2V UNK. FLTS. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
ECM II (RDR OR COMM ECM) ECM FLTS.
CAP III FOUR 2V UNK. FWD.QTR. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
CAP IV TWO 4V UNK. FLTS. SAME Q + 45D
CAP/ FOUR 4V UNK. FLTS. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
ECM V
CAP VI FOUR 4V UNK. FWD.QTR. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
CAP/EW FOUR 2V UNK. ON EW RNG. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
VII
CAP/EW FOUR 4V UNK. ON EW RNG. TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
VIII
LAT I FOUR SECTION LOW ALT. TRNG
(MAY BE OPPOSED)
TWO OF THE SAME Q + 45D
STK/ECM/ TWO OPPOSED OVRLND COORD. SAME Q + 45D
EW/OPDEC STK. W/RDR OR COMM ECM
MF I FIRE ONE RDR MISSILE SAME Q + 36M
MF II FIRE ONE IR MISSILE SAME 2 + 36M
AAG I ONE GUNNERY (AA) FLT
.
SAME Q + 3M
AAG II ONE GUNNERY V MANEUV.DART SAME Q + 3M
SAR/CAS
I
SECT. FIRE/NO FIRE RESCAP SAME Q + 6M
MAS/ECM
I
SIM. OR FLT. SAME Q + 45D
MAS/ECM SIM. OR FLT. SAME Q + 45D
II







MAS/ECM SIM. OR FLT. SAME Q +45
IV
EMCON/ ONE FLT. SAME Q +6M
OPSEC I
SSC I ONE FLT. SAME Q +12
AR I SIX DAY PLUGS SAME Q +2M
AR II SIX NIGHT PLUGS SAME Q +2M
NATOPS SIM. OR FLT. SAME ANNUAL
CHECK
INST. SIM. OR FLT. SAME ANNUAL
CHECK
FCLP/ IAW LSO NATOPS SAME VARIES
ACLS
CARR IAW LSO NATOPS SAME VARIES
QUALS
RECCE I THREE LOW ALT OR TWO LOW ALT Q +2M
FRS TARPS SYLLABUS OR TARPS
RECCE II TWO STAND OFF TARPS SAME Q +2M
RECCE III ONE MAPPING TARPS SAME Q +5M
RECCE IV ONE STK RECCE SAME Q +3M
RECCE V TWO NIGHT IR RECCE SAME Q +2M
RECCE VI TRAEX SAME Q +2M
RECCE VII ONE DAY SSC TARPS SAME Q +3M
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